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9, 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 16000

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Company instituted suit in 1970, wherein it
challenged the validity and constitutionality of Salt Lake
City's Business Revenue Tax.

However, in 1971 the Court

dismissed that suit with prejudice, based on a stipulation
of the litigants.

Thereafter, in March 1978 the Plaintiff-

Company again filed suit, challenging the said Business
Revenue Tax and, additionally, the City's Franchise Fee
ordinance.
In this latter Complaint, the Company alleges three
causes of action:
(a)

That the Utility Revenue Tax and Business Franchise

Fee of the City constituted a utility rate increase and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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illegally usurped the prerogatives of the Public Service
Commission;
(b)

That the Franchise Fee and Business Revenue Tax

taxed the Telephone Company disproportionately, without a
rational basis; and
(c)

That the City law discriminately classified the

Company for City taxing purposes.

This cause of action also

alleged that the tax impositions were in violation of the
requirements of 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann. and violated the
requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions.
DlSPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The Plaip{;c-

'.c

t:=omolaint,

including all of its alleged

causes of action, vJas dismissed with prejudice on Salt Lake
City's Hotion for Summary LTudgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT O'l l'oPPEAL
Defendant-Respondent Salt Lake City seeks to have this
Court affirm the judgment of the District Court and award
costs to it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the
party against whom the

~1otion

for Summary Judgment \vas

brought, they demonstrate the following:
l.

The Appellant-Telephone Company

(hereinafter

"Company") obtained the riyht to use the City rnacls and other
public ways for its own business purpos0s.

-2-

In consideration
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therefor,

it agreed to pay 2% of its gross revenues derived

from sales within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City
for that "franchise" privilege.

(Bill No. 78 of 1951 attach-

ed to Affidavit of City Recorder, Mildred

v.

Higham; R-150).

Similar agreements and ordinances were adopted with reference
to Mountain States Fuel Supply Company and the Utah Power
& Light Company.

(Bill No.

65 of 1953 and Bill No. 4 of

1951, attached to Affidavit of Mildred
2.

v.

Higham; R-150)

On or about December 19, 1951, Mountain States

Telephone & Telegraph Company requested rate authority
from the Public Service Commission of Utah to pass through
to their customers franchise fees,

license taxes and other

local assessments; these assessments were to be a surcharge
to customer billings on a pro-rata basis.

Their request

was approved and, on or about May 5, 1952, an order was
issued by the Public Service Commission to add the pro-rata
share of "taxes" and "impositions" of any city to a customer's
The Telephone Company, as requested, was specifically

bill.

granted authority to pass through any increases in local
taxes by merely filing with the Public Service Commission an
amendment to the "Tax Adjustment Schedule."

(Public Service

Commission Report, Findings and Order dated May 5, 1952 and
Admissions of Plaintiff dated May 14, 1978; R-178-191.)
3.

G9den City challenged the said Public Service Com-

mission order; however, the Attorney General and the Telephone
('n•nrany' s present law firm successfully defended the CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

sion's order in all particulars.

4.

In addition to the aforesaid "Franchise Fee," each

of the three above stated utilities were the subject of a
Business Revenue License Tax, which tax was levied on their
gross income pursuant to an ordinance passed by the Salt Lake
City Commission June 29, 1967.

(Bill No.

38 of 1967,

attached as Exhibit "6" to l\ffidavit of t1ildred

v.

Higham;

R-150).

5.

The three said affected utilities instituted liti-

gation lo challenge the said Business Revenue License Tax.
They asserted,
Tax

,,, "-'nq other issues, that the Revenue License

(as opposed to the Franchise Fee) was invalid:

(l)

As

it conflicted with the provisions of the franchise agreement,
(2) Because the tax exceede4 the City's legislative enabling
power,

(3) Because it was discriminatory against the three

said utilities,

in contravention to State law, plus the

Federal and Utah Constitutions.

(Complaint of the three

above stated utilities versus Salt Lake City, Third District
Court case No.
6.

192098;

R-439).

Identical issues were also raised in a similar

lawsuit filed against Ogden City; however,

the

Qyde~

case

came for hearing before the Utah Supreme Court prior in time
to the Salt Lake City litigation.
as amicus curiae in that case and the

Su~rcme

Court issued

an opinion affirming the enahl i ng ['ower of that city to levy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Business Revenue Tax.

Also, the Court held that the tax

was not discriminatory or unlawful in any particular.
(Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., et al. v. Ogden
City, 26 U.2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (Utah, 1971)).

Subsequent

to that ruling, the three named utility companies stipulated
to a dismissal with prejudice, and their litigation, against
Salt Lake City was dismissed.

(Stipulation dated October

12, 1971 and the Order of October 15, 1971; R-182, 445).
7.

On or about July 1, 1976, the Board of Salt Lake

City Commissioners passed an ordinance increasing the Business
Revenue License Tax from two to four percent to balance its
1976-77 fiscal year budget.
8.

(Bill No. 115 of 1976; R-151).

On or about June 30, 1977, the Board of Salt Lake

City Commissioners passed an ordinance increasing the Business
Revenue Tax on the three named utilities in an amount equal
to six percent of their gross revenue.

(Bill No. 110 of

1977; R-151).
9.

The Business Revenue Tax is not a "regulatory"

provision; rather, the ordinance provision concerning the
revenue tax specifically provides that it is not a substitute
for other regulatory ordinances and enacted ".
to raise revenue for municipal purposes.

solely
(Section

20-3-12.3 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965;
R-408-410).
10.

For the 1977-78 fiscal year, Salt Lake City general

fund budget totalled $39,800,000.

In that budget, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utility Franchise Fee and the Utility Business Revenue License
Tax estimated revenue totctlled $8,000,000.

Thus, the said

sources of revenue represent 20% of the City's general revenue
budget.

A loss of said income would cripple the delivery of

municipal services, funded by the general fund, which includes
police, fire,

street maintenance, garbage pickup and other

essential life supporting services provided by the City.
(Affidavit of City Auditor, K. Ray Hammond, R-406, 407)
11.

On July 26, 1977

(before this suit was filed),

the City enacted Section 20-3-14.1 of the Revised City Ordinances which provided that there would also be levied a 6%
gross revenue buc:

~--~s

tax on every business or company

engaged in business, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake
City, supplying telephone service, gas or electrical energy
service in competition with the three above named utility
companies.
12.

(R-6, 7, 14; SR-57, 236; SR-257).
The business organizations chiefly affected by

the above stated ordinance have contested the tax by arguing,
among other assertions, that they are not in "competition"
with the Telephone Company in providing "Local Exchange
Service" which is the service taxable under the law.

(SR-237;

SR-238; SR-257, 258).
13.

The Telephone Company, on frequent occasions, met

with representatives of this office and those other competitors who arguably could be subject to the additional taxation.
The City has sought to obtain adequate

info~mation

with which
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to evaluate the respective positions and it has received
some; however, the Telephone Company has never provided
the financial data which the City and counsel representing
one of the alleged competitors of the Telephone Company
understood would be supplied.
14.

(R-257-258).

The Telephone Company has not alleged in its com-

plaint that the City has acted in bad faith in enforcing
the ordinance.

(R-2-8).

In fact, the City has vigorously

attempted to resolve the factual and legal disputes involved,
and is proceeding with vigor, equally and in good faith to
enforce its taxing ordinances against all persons who may
legally come under the law's provisons.

It fully intends

to collect and enforce said ordinances as soon as definitional,
legal and conceptual problems in this specialized industry
can be resolved.

(R-257, 258; Cf. the refusal of the Tele-

phone Company to respond to interrogatories on this subject
in Interrogatory Nos. 23, 24 and 25 of the Telephone Company's
Answer to the City's First Set of Interrogatories, R-188190).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ASSERTION THAT SALT LAKE CITY IS
ILLEGALLY SETTING UTILITY RATE SCHEDULES
THROUGH ITS TAXING POl•lERS, CONTRARY
TO THE POWERS VESTED IN THE UTAH PUBLIC
SERVICE COHI'1ISSION, IS UNFOUNDED.
A.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TARIFF
ORDER DIRECTED AN AUTOMATIC RATE AD.JUSTMENT EQUAL TO LOCAL TAX OR FRANCHISE
FEE IMPOSITIONS.
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It is to be noted that the Telephone Company's complaint
asserts that the Respondent, Salt Lake City, is illegally
setting rate schedules, which power is expressly vested in
the Utah Public Service Commission.

However, the undisputed

facts demonstrate that on or about December 19, 1951 Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company requested the Utah
Public Service Commission to am0nd its general tariff orders
and authorize that Company to p ss through to its customers
(as a surcharge)

local taxes levied against the Company on a

pro-rata basis.
In summarizing the position of the Plaintiff-Company,
the Public Servic2

~ommission

stated:

"Mountain States [the plaintiff] contends that
fair and non-discriminatory rates require the
recovery of these expenses [municipal taxes]
apart from state-wide rate schedules, and has
filed the tariff in question to accomplish such
results."
Public Service Commission of Utah
Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 83,
Reports, Findings and Order, R-30.
The Commission noted that municipal sales, use, occupation,
franchise, gross receipts and other charges against utilities
had evolved to become a significant factor in utility expenses.
As such, to include them within the State-wide rate would
constitute a discrimination against users resioing o_ut:__:;idEC.__
the respective municipalities.

Therefore, it stated with

respect to the Telephone Company's 1951 proposal:
"Mountain States under the proposeo tariff,
would recover the amount of such tax expenses
from the users of its service within the
respective municipalities assessing such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-8administered by the Utah State Library.
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taxes and impositions."
Id. at p. 4.

I.& S. Docket No. 83,

Thereafter, the Commission noted that these local taxes
were likely to continue to raise.

It observed:

"It is equally apparent that as the costs of
operating municipal governments grow levies for
these various taxes and fees are likely to increase unevenly, thereby accentuating the discrimination."
I.& S. Docket No. 83, Id. at
p. 6; R-33.
The Commission then correctly noted that the cities had the
power to increase these taxes.

It observed:

"Apparently each city or town may increase or
decrease these exactions in its own discretion.
This being so these impositions will continue
to fluctuate widely so that rates constructed to
spread these expanses to users of telephone
service throughout the State have the aspect of
unlawful discrimination." I.& S. Docket No.
~, Id. at p. 9; R-36.
Thus, the Commission granted the plaintiff's 1952
request for flexible authority to pass on any local taxes
on a pro-rata basis.

The utility company was directed to file

a "Tax Adjustment Schedule," showing all of these special
taxes and impositions which had been imposed by a city or
town; thereafter, it was authorized to pass on the new tariff
rate as a surcharge to its billing, without a new rate hearing.

The Commission specifically ruled and held:
"Upon the filing of such Tax Adjustment Schedule as above provided, the company is authorized
and directed to change the rates for exchange
service and the exchanges affected thereby
·nmposition of municipal taxes), in accordance
with such schedule and said tariff, on billing
cLi"ted immedi_a__1:~ subsegue!"lt thereto." ~
Docket-No~--83, Id. at p. 12; R-39 (Emphasls
adrfocf) . - - - - -
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Further, the Plaintiff was specifically authorized to file
amended schedules as new taxes or extractions were levied
in the future by cities.

The order specifically provided:

"Said company [plaintiff] shall file from time
to time amendments and revisions of said Tax
Adjustment Schedule at the rates and amounts of
such taxes, imposition and other charges, or
the base on which the tax or imposition is
measured are changed, altered or amended.
I.& S. Dock(0_~~8_l, Id. at p. 12; R-39.
This order was challenged in court and this Court affirmed it
in all particulars.

The Court summarized the central issue

as follows:
"The question remains:
Can the commission permit a ut i_l: t , to charge and bill subscribers
of an arc,o, for paymPnt of imposts on the
company levied by local governmental authority
of that area?"
Qqden Cit_y_~__.__l"__ublic;_ Serv~c:~
Commission, 260 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah, 1953).
Thereafter, the Court reviewed some of the abundant authority
upholding similar decisions of Public Service Commissions
across the country and held as follows:
"[The Commission Order surcharging local taxes)
conf0rms more nearly to the views of this court ,
particularly where, as here, ever-changing and
probably ever-increasing local imposts appear on
the horizon which neither the legislature nor
the company to date has controlled, and where,
should we conc-lUde- otherv:{se,dTSCrlmination
would fluctuate in-direct_E_~_port_io__rl____t:_o the
actions of a myriad of local _governin__g___l:J_cldies."
csgden---ci t-y v -:--PubTic -servi c-e-comm:lssion, 12L ~
at p. 7 53 (Emphasis added)-.--------~

* * *
"The order of the Commission is not only an
exercise of i t_s_le___g:_~authCJ__r__ itjr;_lJut
s_
t:_Q_bas_ic equities, - a t least eliminating nne
discrimination in a field where it is irnpos'3ihle

app-cir
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to eliminate them all,"
added).

Id. at p.

754

(Emphasis

Other jurisdictions which have considered the problem
have likewise, with unanimity, upheld Public Service Commissian orders allowing utility companies to pass on local taxes
as a surcharge on their current billing, without new rate
hearings.
On such well reasoned and authoritative opinion is the
decision of the City of Scottsbluff v. United Tel. Co. of
the 1\lest, 106 N.1<1.2d 12

(Neb., 1960).

In this case the court

discussed the several alternatives for tariff adjustments
to cover the expense of local taxation.

It noted that the

surcharge method of passing through the taxes on a pro-rata
basis avoided the problems of discrimination on other utility
subscribers, living outside that city.

It also correctly

noted that such an automatic surcharge increase avoided the
costly and time consuming problem of frequent rate hearings,
whenever local taxes were increased.

The Court then succinctly

held:
"We are convinced that the department [Commission
fixing telephone rates], in so far as such taxes
[local city occupation tax] are concerned, has
the power to fix special exchange rates applicable to the different communities, which will
in effect require the ratepayers in each comi11un:L fy-to absorb a sum equal to the amount of
the tax which respondent is required to pay
to that municipality." City of Scottsbluff v.
United Tel. Co. of the 1\lest, Id. at p. 20
(Emphasis~added).

For other cases with similar ruling as Utah and Nebraska,
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see:

State ex rel Pacific Tel. &

Public Service, 142 P.2d 498

Teleg~h

Co. v. Dept. of

(Wash., 1943), cited with appro-

val by the Utah Supreme Court; c:::_ity_of Newport News v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 96 S.E.2d 145 (Va.)
Village

~f

Ma)'wood v.

Illinois Commerce Commission, 178

N.E.2d 345 (Ill., 1961);
Gas

&

~ity

of Elmhurst v. Western United

Electric Co., l N.E.2d 489

(Ill., 1946); City__c:>!_

Scottsbluff v. United Telephone of the West, 106 N.W.2d
12

(Neb., 1960); State ex rel City of Seattle v. Dept. of

Public Uj:_i_l i

t~es,

960 (Cole'.

;_ lJ 7 0) .

207 P. 2d 712

(Wash., 1949); Colorado

It is respectfully submitted that the Public Service
Commission of Utah has power to hold hearings and determine
the appropriate utilitv rates.
Code Ann., 1953, as amended.

See, 54-7-l et seq. Utah
They have exercised that power

as detailed above and permitted local impositions of taxes
and fees to be made as an additure to utility billing.
Separate and apart from the Commission's power, under
clear Utah law, a City has power to impose occupation taxes
or fees for the use of its public property as provided in
Section 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

The power to raise

taxes for City purposes is a separate function, belonging to
local government.

It is entirely distinguishable from the

rate-making authority of the Public Service Commission in
deciding how such costs 1nay or rnay not be inc1ur1ed in lhe
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charges ultimately made by the utility companies to their
customers.
Regarding the latter issue, the Public Service Commission
has set those rates to automatically be adjusted upward to
reflect the local tax increases, by a surcharge on a customer's
bill.

This tariff order has been approved by the Utah Supreme

Court.

Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the

Telephone Company's assertion that the City has somehow usurped
the function of the Public Service Commission is specious.
Appellant has presented no basis in law or fact to justify
relief.

Thus,

the complaint was properly dismissed by the

lower court.
B.

APPELLANT'S CASES DO NOT STAND FOR THE
PROPOSITION CITED, AND DO NOT HOLD FOR
A POSITION CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE
CO~~ISSION ORDER OR THE UTAH DECISION
UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THAT ORDER.

It is interesting to note that the Appellant-Telephone
Company has had all the above cited cases upholding the validity of the similar Public Service orders for over four
months.

These other jurisdictions affirmed virtually identi-

cal systems to Utah, which set utility rates to include
future tax increases by merely filing

notice of the increased

tax cost with the regulatory body.
However,

significantly, Appellant has not even mentioned

those cases or attempted to distinguish those authorities
supporting the City's position in its brief.

Rather, it has

r:it 0 d thr0'e cases, whose holdings are irrelevant and immaterial
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to the issue before the Court.
Brief.

Seep. 18 of Appellant's

Please note:

1.

Appellant cites Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell, 340

N.E.2d 98

(Ill.App., 1975) for the proposition that the

Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to
set utility rates.

The City has no disagreement with that

assertion, but it is not at issue in this case.

Rather,

the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that the rate
schedules were adopted by the Public Service Commission.
These rate formulas permitted the utilities to automatically
adjust the schedule by filing notice of a taxing cost increase which was then included as additure on the rate
tariff

auth~rity,

without an additional rate hearing.

Further, it is important to note that the Illinois
Bell case does not stand for the proposition that such a
self-implementing rate adjustment order by the Public
Service Commission is illegal as inferred by Appellant.
Rather, that case dealt exclusively with an allegation by
a customer that a telephone company's practice of providing
free service to retired officers, directors and employees
violated the Public Utilities Act of that jurisdiction.
The theory of the plaintiff in that litigation was that
other customers were charged higher rates to subsidize the
privileged class of former company employees.
sought to have

The plaintiff

the Court fix the utility rates by ordering

a reduction of rates for the class of which he was a member.
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The Court correctly noted in dicta it would be a usurpation of the function of the Commission for the Court to fix
the rates, as requested.

However, the

Court's decision,

denying the requested relief, was premised on the fact that
the plaintiff did not appeal from the administrative decision
of the Commission when that regulatory body considered the
precise issue raised in the litigation.

Thus, the Court held

as follows:
"The doctrine of exhaustion has long been a
basic principle of administrative law, and a
party aggrieved by administrative action
ordinarily cannot seek review in the courts
without first pursuing all administrative
remedies available to him.
Id. at
p.

lOS.

Obviously, the case does not stand for proposition that
the order of the Utah Public Service Commission is or was
illegal.
may not

Further, it does not hold that local government
increase its taxes for utilities for the utilities

to pay in any way they may deem logal or appropriate.

How-

ever, it does stand for the proposition that one cannot
collaterally attach a Commission order when one has failed
to exhaust administrative remedies, which the Telephone
Company has done in this case and which point will be discussed hereafter at page 17.
2.

The case of Mississippi Public Service Commission

v. Home Telephone Company, 110 S.2d 618

(Miss., 1959)

cited at p. 18 of Appellant's Brief is not related factually
or in legal principle to the issues before the Court.

In
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this case, a challenge was made concerning certain alleged
business expenses which were used by the Public Service
Commission in setting telephone company rates.

The Court

ruled that the Public Service Commission had the power to
refuse to consider excessively high salaries in setting
utility rates.

It held that

the Commission could not pro-

hibit the payment of such salaries, but it could exclude
from "operating expenses" the excess payments, when calculating costs for rate-setting purposes.
The Court further noted that the function of ratemaking wos legislative in character and that the Court could
not fix

t~e

public util1ty rates.

Rather, it was the Court's

function to ,ietermine whether the Public Service Commission
proceeding was conducted in harmony with law, the conclusions were supported by substantial evidence or whether the
rates constituted a

co~fiscatory

taking.

The Mississippi

Court noted that the lower court erred in fixing

a rate of

return for the Telephone Company and, further, correctly
stated:
"The function of rate making is purely
legislative in character.
It is not within
the power of a court to fix the rates to
be charged by public utilities, although a
court may restrain the imposition of a confiscatory rates, or, under the Public Utility Act,
determine whether the rates as fixed are supported by substantial evidence or within the
other statutory restrictions set forth in
[the] Code,
(citations omitted)."
Id. at p. 626.
The case before

the bar docs not

h~ve

an issue concerning

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-16Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

what salaries may be used as operating expense, and there
is no issue of a court attempting to set a utility rate.
That ruling simply does not relate to the issues of this
case.
3.

Similarly, the case of State of Texas v. Southwes-

tern Bell Telephone Company, cited at p. 18 of Appellant's
Brief is unrelated to any issue before the Court.

In that

case, a privately owned telephone company, in a jurisdiction
unregulated by a governmental regulatory agency, increased
the rate for its intra-state long distance telephone calls.
The rate increase was challenged by the Attorney General of
the State as excessive.
The appellate Court held that in the absence of regulation, by an authorized governmental body, the private utility
company could set its own intra-state rates, subject to
judicial review under common la1v principles.

After citing

authority for the proposition that such utility rates were
subject to the limitations dictated by "reasonableness"
and "justice," the Court held:
"This legal obligation upon the telephone
company--that of not extracting exorbitant
or unreasonable charges for its services-would be meaningless if there were no judicial
redress for its violation." Id. at 526 S.W.2d
529.
Again, the facts of this case and its holding have no applicability to the issues before this Court.

c.

THE APPELLANT-COMPANY )lAY NOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK A PUBLIC CO~IISSION ORDER,
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PROMULGATED AT APPELLANT'S REQUEST AND
JUDICIALLY DEFENDED BY APPELLANT, WilEN
IT DID NOT EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES TO CHALLENGE OR MODIFY THE
ORDER.
The undisputed facts of record clearly
that the City

demonstrate

has not undertaken to fix utility rates;

rather, the Telephone Company in the instant case has utilized
a 1952 Public Service Commission order to pass through certain City assessments to its customers on a pro-rata basis.
It has implemented this Public Service Commission order by
filing "Adjusted Tax Schedules," as per the requirements of
that order.

See Statement of Facts 1-3, supra.

Further, it is of significant import that the Telephone
Company has, at no time since the entry of the Public Service Commission Order in 1952, sought to rescind or amend
that Order or to seek judicial review of it.

In fact

(as

noted in the Statement of ?acts), the Telephone Company and
its present counsel obtained the Order through its own
petition to the Public Service Commission and successfully
judicially defended that Order.
The law concerning Public Service Commission orders
provides:
"The Commission may at any time, upon notice
to the public utility affected and after
opportunity to be heard as provided in the
case of complaints, rescind, alter or amend
any order or decision made by it. Any order
rescinding, altering or amending a prior
order or decision shall when served upon the
Public Utility affected h~v0 the same effect
as herein provided for original orders or
decisions." 54-7-13 Uloh Code Ann., 1953
(Emphasis added).
-~ ·- ----~
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Further, the law specifically provides:
"In all collateral actions or proceedings

the orders and decisions of the Commission
which have become final shall be conclusive."
54-7-14 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added).
It is further to be noted that certiorari must be applied
for within 30 days after an application for rehearing is
denied or within 30 days after the rendition of a decision
on rehearing; otherwise, the decision is final and not
assailable.

See, 54-7-16 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

This Court and other jurisdictions have consistently
held that these administrative decisions cannot be collaterally attacked.

These decisions are final, if appropriate

review is not obtained by petitioning for a rehearing,
seeking an amendment or modification or (where appropriate)
seeking timely judicial revie1·1 of the decision.

North Salt

Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600,
223 P.2d 577
98

(1950); Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell, 340 N.E.2d

(Ill.App. 1975).
In the instant case, the Telephone Company is clearly

attempting to collaterally attack an order it obtained.

It

has not sought to amend, modify or rescind, as required by
law; further,

it is an order '.'lhich the Telephone Company

has not sought to otherwise have administratively or judicially
reviewed.
In addition, it is signi=icant that the collateral
attack it now seeks is selecti·.'e and applies only to Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lake City.

Since 1952, when the original commission order

was entered at the request of the Telephone Company, that
Company has annually filed amendments to its Tax Adjustment Schedules with the Public Service Commission, to take
benefit of that order, by passing through to its customers
the local tax impositions.

(R-291, 228).

As late as January 5, 1978, it filed its "Municipal
Charge Adjustment Schedule," wherein it listed the tax
schedules of 41 Utah municipalities from American Fork through
Vernal.

The Company thereby obtained legal sanction to pass

through to its customers the tax impositions of these jurisdictions vntlF'•-•l the need of further hearings before the Public
Service

Commission or internal absorption of these costs

of doing business.

See R-228.

Thus, it is apparent that the Telephone Company seeks
to have the advantage of the automatic rate increase schedule
provided by the Public Service Commission and, yet
litigation) selectively seek its application.

(in this

The statutory

and case law prohibitions against collateral attack were
certainly intended to avoid such duplicatious dealing,
where a utility could retain the advantages of an order,
avoid a full review by the administrative body, yet seek
selective and limited judicial remedies.
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court decision dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellant's claim that
the City is setting utility rates contrary to the Public
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Service Commission authority is and was correct.

The Tele-

phone Company's claim is ludicrous, specious and unfounded
in law or fact.

This judicial action is, in fact, an illegal

collateral attack on a Public Service Commission order,
implemented at the request of the Telephone Company.

Thus,

the lower court decision should be affirmed by this Court.
POINT II
THERE EXISTS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT
ANY ALLEGATION OF THE TELEPHONE
COMPANY THAT THE ORDINANCE BEFORE
THE COURT IS FACIALLY INVALID OR
HAS BEE!J DISCRH1INATORILY APPLIED
OR ADMINISTERED; FURTHER, APPELLANT'S
COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED ON
THESE THEORIES.
The Telephone Company-Appellant, in its brief, stresses
that the lower court erred in failing to take cognizance
of alleged disputed issues of fact concerning its competition,
subsequent to the Telerant decision.

Its Brief co-mingles

the two separate legal theories concerning alleged "facial"
and "as applied" discriminatory treatment.

Further, it

incorrectly asserts that the City does not require its competitors to pay the same business taxes as it does.

A proper

evaluation of the theories require that they be discussed
separately.
A.

THE CITY BUSINESS REVENUE TAXING
ORDINANCE, ON ITS FACE, TREATS ALL
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED THE SAME
AND CONSTITUTIONALLY CLASSIFIES
TAXPAYERS.

It must be noted that the City law under discussion
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specifically provides that the Business Revenue Tax applies
to the three public service utilities and their competitors.
It expressly provides:
"There is hereby levied upon the business of
every person or company engaged in the business
in Salt Lake City, Utah, of supplying telephone service, gas or electric energy service
in competition with public utilities, an
annual license tax equal to six percentum of
the gross revenue derived from the sale and
use of such competitive services delivered
from and after November 1, 1977, within the
corporate limits of Salt Lake City.
"'In competition with public utilities' shall
mean to trade in products or services within
the same market as a public utility taxed
under section 14 of this chapter." 20-3-14.1
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965,
as amended,, R-6, 14.
Thus, it is clear that, even if one assumes that proper
classification requires that appellant's competitors be
included within the scope of the taxing law, the ordinance
is per se proper in its scope and classification. 1
Appellant has cited three cases to support its "Point
I" assertion that there exist issues of fact requiring a
hearing to demonstrate discriminatory tax collection practices
by the City.

However, none of these cases dealt with dis-

criminatory application of a valid statute; rather, each
involved a law, invalid on its face,

for failure to

within its scope those persons similarly situated.

include
For

example:
1. Note:
The City asserts that there is no such requirement,
which issue is discussed hereafter in Point III.
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1.

Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Railway Co., 45

Utah 50, 142 P.2d 1067 (1944)
Brief.

is cited at page 9 of Appellant's

In this case, the Court affirmed the power of the

city to impose an occupation tax in addition to a franchise
fee.

It stated that the tax, levied in addition to the

franchise payments for the Company's use of city streets,
was legal.

It stated:

"Neither is there any question concerning the
right of the city to impose an occupation or
license tax." Id. at p. 1070, citing Salt Lake
City v. Christensen, 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523.
Thereafter, it analysed the city ordinance and observed
that it did not tax all within the appropriate business
class.

Rather, the ordinance specifically taxed only those

businesses distributing electricity through "meters".

The

stipulated facts showed that many other businesses distributed electricity, without using meters.

Therefore, the

court held the law invalid on its face by stating:
"But in limiting the tax to those who use
meters for the purpose mentioned in the
ordinance destroys its uniformity." Id.
at p. 1071.
In the case before the bar, the ordinance has no such
restriction.

In fact, it specifically taxes all those

businesses "in competition" with the taxed utilities.

Ob-

viously, there is no similarity to the facial invalidity
of the 1914 statute and the one before this Court.
2.

In Orem City v. Pyne (discussed at p. 13 of Appel-

lilnt's Brief), the Court like\·lise found an improper facial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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classification in the ordinance.

Here, a seller of tangible

personal property (used cars) was subject to a license tax
of up to $300, but other retail sellers of tangible property
(e.g., implement dealers or appliance shops), doing business
at the same volume, were taxed to a maximum of $25.

The

lower court correctly observed:
"Our [the court's] function is to determine
whether an enactment operates equally upon
all persons similarly situated." Orem City
v. Pyne, 4th Dist. Case No. 4039 (1964),
R-264 cited in Orem City v. Pyne, 16 Utah 2d
355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965).
Thus, the Pyne Court ruled the ordinance void.
Obviously, there is no similarity in the ordinance
under analysis and the one ruled defective in the Pyne case.
The Orem ordinance did not deal with public utilities and
did not purport to tax them or their competitors.

There-

fore, it can be of little assistance to this Court, except
restating the accepted legal principle that classifications
between groups of taxpayers cannot be whimsical or capricious.
3.

In Slater v. Salt Lake City,

(cited at page 14 of

Appellant's brief), this Court refused to enjoin the enforcement of a city law prohibiting sidewalk commercial solicitations, in the City's central business district.

However, in

so ruling, it held one provision of the ordinance discriminatory because it permitted the sale of receipts, redeemable
in photographs, but prohibited the sale of magazine subscriptions.

The Court found this distinction, on its face, to
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be an unreasonable classification of persons "similarly
situated".
Significantly, the Court did not address the alleged
issue of discriminatory application of the law.

Rather, in

its lengthy discussion (which approved virtually all other
legislative classifications), the Court aptly summarized the
legal standards to be applied by the Court in reviewing
legislative classifications; e.g.:
(a)

The legislative body has the widest latitude in

formulating classifications; the court will not concern
itself with policy decisions.

The Court observed:

"In fixing the limits of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion and this
court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the law." Slater v. Salt
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160
(1949).
(b)

Distinctions between classes are constitutional,

unless they are "unreasonable"; that is, the legislature
may not make classifications that are arbitrary and capricious
in light of the purpose of the act, by treating persons
similarly situated differently.

The Court stated:

. if we are unable to find any reasonable
basis for the classification, then we cannot
sustain the enactment.
'There must be
a reasonable basis for the differentiation
between that class .
., which basis must
bear a reasonable relation to the purposes to
be accomplished by the imposition of the
condition.
If those subjected to the condition
are similarly situated to those free from the
condition, the differentiation would be without basis and hence arbitrary and therefore
unconstitutional.
'" Slater v. Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-25Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

City, Id. at p. 163, quoting Wallberg v. PubTiclvelfare Comm., at 203 P. 2d 94T(Emphasis
added).
It must be specifically noted that the majority of the
ordinance's classifications were upheld as "based on reason".
The Court approved permits for the magazine sales, religious
solicitations, sight seeing trip sales and other exceptions
to the general prohibition of sidewalk vending, and noted:
"There is a valid and reasonable ground
of distinction with nothing arbitrary
about it." Id. at p. 163.
The City has no quarrel with these points of law, which
are further discussed in Point IV, infra.

However, contrary

to the T2lr,)"one Company's assertion in its brief, there are
no issues cf fact to be determined on the per se or facial
validity of the law.

Rather, as Appellant points out at

length in its Brief, the Telephone Company has matters of
record, asserting that it is losing business to terminal
unit sales competitors.

These facts, for the purpose of the

summary judgment motion, are assumed to be correct.
There may be issued as to whether "terminal" equipment
competitors are in the business of selling "Local Exchange
Telephone Services," taxable under the City ordinance and,
thus not subject to the tax.

This phrase, however, is one

of art in the communication industry and the phrase apparently excludes sales of "terminal ec1uipment."
of Fact 12; SR-2 37, 238; SR-2 57, 2 58.

See, Statement

Further, there are

issues of causation between the tax and the competitive loss
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by the Company.

Importantly,

however, the City ordinance now under

evaluation, specifically includes the "competitors" of the
Telephone Company in the taxing scheme.

Thus, there are no

factual issues to resolve on the facial or per se validity
of the ordinance classifications.

The Appellant-Company

has simply improperly confused two separate legal theories
in alleging that a factual issue exists concerning the
classification problem.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the lower
court correctly held that the ordinance was facially valid
and that it did not discriminatorily classify similarly
situated taxpayers.

No case cited by Appellant is similar,

in fact, to the ordinance under discussion.

The City law,

on its fact, clearly includes all those in competition with
the Appellant and patently includes within its scope all
those persons similarly situated.

Thus, no classification

principle has been violated and, as a matter of law, the
ordinance is facially valid.
B.

THE TELEPHONE COMPANY HAS FAILED TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED AND, FURTHER, THERE EXISTS NO
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT TO SUPPORT AN
ALLEGATION THAT THE ORDINANCE BEFORE
THE COURT HAS BEEN DISCRIMINATORILY
APPLIED OR ADMINISTERED.

The law concerning a theory of discriminatory application
C'<lllrt

of a taxing statute is well defined in case law.

This

has surcj nctly stated:
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"However, before this result is reached
[avoiding lax liability on the grounds of
discriminato~y application of a taxing
statute], it must be shown that there is an
intentional and systematic violation of those
constitutional principles, or some designed
effort to violate them, to the injury of
the complainant.

* * *
"A merely mistaken or inadvertent failure to
properly apply the law, even if it results in
discrimination, does not provide a basis for
recovery by a taxpayer because of violation of
his constitutional guarantees.
It would be
a doctrine hazardous indeed to the taxing
process and to the maintenance of government
to rule that if the assessor has made mistakes in taxing others, a complaining taxpayer could escape taxation.
The result would
be that the law could not be applied to anyone
until 1t was correctly applied to all.
It
requl~es very little imagination to see that
this would extend, not curtail, noncompliance
with the law. Even though it may be difficult
or impossible to achieve completely, the
desideratum, of course, is that there be
uniformity and equality in taxation, and that
is the objective to be constantly pursued.
However, the fact that this ideal is not reached
should not be permitted to discourage attempts
of taxing officials to bring it about, nor
to defeat the legislative purpose. Where
some taxpayers are not being taxed in accordance with the law, the proper way to rectify
the situation is by proceeding toward uniform and proper application and not by extending the erroneous application to others."
Thiokol Chemical Corooration v. Peterson,
15 U. 2d- 353, 393 P. 2d 391, 396 (Utah, 1964)
and authorities therein cited (Emphasis
added).
See also, Salt Lake City v. Robbins,
450 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1976).
It must specifically be noted that there is no allegation in Appellant's complaint that there exists a

systematic

and intentional failure to equally enforce the taxing statute.
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Sec, the Company's Third Cause of Action, R-6.

Thus, the

Telephone Company failed to state a claim to support such
a theory, by failing to allege an intentional and systematic
violation.

Further, the undisputed facts will not support

that theory, even if the complaint were amended.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Salt Lake City
specifically requested the Telephone Company to outline
what businesses Salt Lake
tax uniformly.

City has allegedly failed to

Further, the City requested detailed infer-

mation concerning what meetings the Compuny and City
have had, with others,

in an attempt

to properly interpret

the City's motive in enforcing its taxing ordinance and bring
all those who should be covered within its collection ambit.
The Court will note from the responses to Interrogatories
No. 23 and 24 that the Company, in essence, stated that:
(a)

It could not name any business who was allegedly sub-

ject to the tax, which was not being taxed, that information
being in the possession of the City and,

(b)

Refused to

provide that information, asserting that it was irrelevant
and ".

. not reasonably likely to elicit relevant informa-

tion, or lead to the discovery of relevant information in
this matter."

See, Ans1ver to Interrogatory No. 24 of the

Appellant's First Set of Interrogatories, R-189, 190.
However, the affidavit filed by the City
th, 1 t
0 ;

demonstrate~

the ordinance provision which included "competitors"

t)p•

utilities in the taxing ambit 1vas added subsequent
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to 1967, in an attempt to meet objections of the Company,
that competitors had an advantage.

This amendment was made

even though this Court had previously ruled that the
classification of the telephone, gas and electric companies
was valid.

The amendment to include their competition was

added in an effort to make the taxation scheme even more
equitable.

See, §20-3-14.1 quoted at page 22, supra.

Since that date, numerous meetings have been held
between the plaintiff and other organizations which are
allegedly in competition with the Telephone Company, to define
whether they are legitimately within the ambit of the ordinance's taxing provisions.

Further, legal research and evalua-

tion is coGLinuing as to the other company's assertion that
such

a taxation scheme violates prohibitions against burdenim

interstate commerce and other substantial legal issues and
interpretations.

See,

State~ent

of Fact No. 13.

The undisputed facts demonstrate that the City has not
knowingly or intentionally failed to assess or collect a
revenue license fee from any person which was legally due.
It has extended a good faith effort to assess and collect
from every person within the de signa ted class their appropriatE
taxes.

Thus, the lower court was correct, as a matter of

law and as a matter of fact, in denying the Company's claim
of discriminatory application of a taxing statute.
The Company may not escape taxation on such a ground;
rather, the appropriate remedy, as cited in the above capSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tioncd cases, would be to compel the City to likewise tax
those who may not be included within the ambit of collection,

if such an assertion were appropriate.
POINT III
THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
TWO OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES, SUBJECTING
THESE TO GROSS REVENUE BUSINESS OCCUPATION TAX IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY, BUT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL IN ALL PARTICULARS.
Notwithstanding the fact that the City has attempted

to accomodate the real or alleged competitive disadvantages
occasioned by the City Business Revenue •rax by taxing competitors, a classification of the three public utilities alone
would be a valid classification, as a matter of law.
The general rule with regard to the levy of any tax is
set forth in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, which states
as follows:
"Classification or persons or property, or
both, for taxing purposes is sanctioned,
provided, of course, that such classification is fair, reasonable and not arbitrary
or whimsical, and based on substantial
distinctions.
Stating the rule more comprehensively, the classification of persons
or occupations for the purpose of municipal
taxation, when founded on natural, intrinsic or fundamental distinctions which are
reasonable in their relation to the object
of legislation and otherwise, will be deemed
valid and binding.
"In this respect the legislature is accorded
a broad range of discretion, which will
not be interfered with by the courts unless
it is clearly apparent that the tax_imposed
is arbitrary, unreasonable, oppresslve or
prohibitive." 16 McQuillin, Municipal
corpciratior1-s §44.20 (Rev.Vol. 1972) (Emphasis ac1de>r1) .
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A case closely in point is the New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573 (N.Y., 1938).

Here,

the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of an excise tax
levied on every utility doing business within the City of
New York, but which separated common carriers in a separate
class.

The Court held:

it has long been the law under the
14th Amendment that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it,
"Since carriers or other utilities with the
right of eminent domain, the use of public
property, special franchises or public contracts, have many points of distinction
from ether businesses, including relative
fre-e-:1om from competition, especially significant with increasing density of population
and municipal expansion, these public
service organization have no valid ground
by virtue of the equal protection clause
to obejct to separate treatment related
to such distinctions.
Carriers may be
treated as a separate class [omitting
cases cited] and, as such, taxed differently or additionally.
[Omitting citations]
This Court has approved the adoption of modes
and methods of assessment and administration peculiar to railroads [omitting
citations] and upheld tax rates for railroads differing from those on other property,
and as between railroad taxpayers [omitting
citations]. Similarly, we have explicitly
recognized that a state may subject public
service corporations to a special or
higher income tax than individuals or
other corporations." [Omitting citations]
Id. at p. 578-579 (Emphasis added).
The propriety of classifying the three service utilities
has already been resolved in the favor of Salt

Lake City.

In a case involving this precise issue, this Court specificali
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hclcl:
"The plaintiffs [including the plaintiff
Telephone Company] comprise a distinct class
of businesses within the public utility
field which supplies to the public a service
or product which is consumed or used by the
public.
We therefore conclude that the
revenue ordinance which classified plaintiffs as a separate class of p-ublic utility
for the purpose of taxation is reasonable
and not discriminatory." Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden City, 487 P.2d
849, 850 (Utah, 1971) (Emphasis added).
See, also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Ames,
4 N.E.2d 494; In Re Opinion of the Justices,
149 A. 321; and Salt Lake City v. Christensen
Co., 95 P. 523 cited in the case above quoted.
Other jurisdictions have unanimously held that such a
classification is justified.

A few other citations support-

ing this position are as follows:

Commonwealth v. Appalachian

Power Co., 68 S.E.2d 122 (Va., 1951), imposing a tax on
every business furnishing water, heat, light and power,
whether by electricity or gas; In the Opinion of Justices,
137 A.2d 726

(N.H., 1958), wherein the State of New Hampshire

upheld a special tax levied solely on the franchises of gas
and electric utilities; In re the Opinion of Justices, 149
A.

321

(N.H., 1930), wherein the State Supreme Court of New

Hampshire upheld a franchise tax on gas and electric utilitics and excluded all other franchisees;
~: v. AmeE,

4 N.E.2d 494

Illinois Bell Tel.

(Ill., 1936), wherein the State of

Illinois imposed a gross receipt tax on each public utility
ir1 the business of transmitting telegraph or telephone
Jnessaqro,

sellinq water, gas or electricity: Potomac Electric
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Pm-IC:r

~_'::__:_

Haze12, 90 F.2d 406

a gross receipt

t~x

(CA DC, 1937), which upheld

by the District of

Colu~bia

on several

utilities including gas, electric, transportation and telephone companies based on their gross earnings for the preceding year.
The Appellant-Telephone Company's nrlef attempts to
distinguish this unanimous case law by:

(a) Ignoring the

fact that the City ordinance taxes its competitors, and
(b) Asserting that the decisions were prior to the time the
1968 Carterfore and the 1974 Telerant decisions, subjecting
them to increased competition.
Significantly, Appellant does not cite even one case
where a state has foJnd such a utility taxing classification
unreasonable in th2 ten intervening years since Carterfore.
In fact, it must be noted that there is not even an assertion
that the states in the 4th Circuit, sJch as Virginia, have
reversed their approval of such classifications after the
4th Circuit court of Appeals' decision of Telerant, relied
upon by the Appellant.
The writer's research supports the silence of Appellant's
Brief.

There appear to be no rulings as now urged by the

Appellant to overrule lhis Court's 1971 holding, that the
utilities are a separate taxing class.
The existence of some competition in the sale or leasing
of terminal eauipment is only one of many factors to be
considered in a classification decision.

It is noted by
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the llnit0d States Supreme Court and approved by this Court,
tl1ese companies enjoy a unique ?OSition in society and under
our laws.

The law is presumed constitutional and if there

is any reasonable basis to sustain the legislative classification it must be upheld by

the Court.

There certainly exists no issues of fact to be
on this facial classification issue.

resolved

Therefore, it is res-

pectfully submitted that the issue of classification has
already been decided by this Court; however, in any event, the
case law is abundant and not subject to challenge at this
The classification of the Appellant and the other

date.

utilities is lawful in all particulars
lative prerogative of Salt

and within the legis-

Lake City Corporation.

POINT IV
THE COMPANY' S CLAIMS l\.RE BARRED BY THE
PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA.
The Appellant-Company's Brief cleverly fails to emphasize
that its present suit not only challenges the City Business
Revenue Tax, but also the Franchise Fee for use of City
streets

which dates back to 1951.

Its suit also seeks cash

reimbursement of all monies paid to the City since July l,
1977.

Importantly, virtually all of the issues raised in the

within case could have been or were, in

fact, raised in a

1970 suit that was dismissed by stipulation, with prejudice.

The principles of res judicata prohibit a plaintiff from
cnrnrt~cnc ing a second action on legal and factual issues, which
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hos been or which could huve been resolved in a previous s11it.
Justice Cardozo accurutely stated the principle as follows:
"A judgment in one action is conclusive in a
later one, not only as to any matters actually
litigated therein, but also as to any that
might have been so litigated, when the two
causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second
would destroy or impair rights or interests
established by the first."
Schuylkill Fuel
Corp. v. B.& C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 165
N.E. 456, 457 cited with approval in Ripley
v. Storer, 132 N.E.2d 87, 90 (N.Y., 1956)
(Emphasis added).
The rule has similarly been summarized as follows:
"Another statement of the rule [res judicata]
is that any right, fact or matter in issue,
and directly adjudicated on, or necessarily
involved in, the determination of an action
before 2 c~mpetent court in which a judgment
OrdecrB=- is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and privies whether or not the claim
or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two suits is the same." 50 C.J.S. Ju-dgments§7l2 p. 173, cited in- Ripley-v-:-storer, Id.
at p. 93 (Emphasis added).
-The courts have been explicit in stating that the policy
reasons behind this rule is to protect the parties and allow
reliance on previous litigation; further,

the rule

pro-

duces judicial economy by putting an end to contests of
determined issues.

A good summary of this rationale is

stated as follows:
"On the other hand, as pointed out in 17
Iowa Law Review 81, the desirability of a
prompt decision on the merits has been emphasized by this court. The doctrine of
res judicata, justified by practical n0ccssity, is designed to promulgate equal justice
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for all litigants, and parties should not be
required to relitigate issues 1vhich they
have already litigated or have had a reasonabl~portunity to litigate.
Once a party
has had an opportunity to be heard he has
had his day in court and cannot thereafter
be he~rd to complain, especially if it can
be sald that he had the opportunity to be
heard on decisive merj.ts." Stuker v. County
of Muscatine, 87 N.W.2d452, 457(1-ow""El; _ __
1958) (Emphasis added).
Likewise, this Court stated:
"'The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once; that, when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties, and those in privity with them
in law or estate . . . public policy and the
interest of the litigants alike require that
there be an end to litigation, and the
peace and order of society demand that
matters distinctly put in issue and determined
ey_a court of competent jurisdiction as
to parties and subject matter shall not be
retried between the same parties in any subsequent suit in any court." Mathews v. Mathews,
102 Utah 428, 132 P.2d 111 (Utah, 1942)
(Emphasis added); Curry v. Educoa Pre-School, Inc.
580 P.2d 222 (Utah, 1978).
This Court has also emphasized:
"Policy would seem to dictate that when a
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his
entire relief, based upon his entire claim,
then the matter should be laid to rest.
He
should be denied a second attempt at substantially the same objective under a different guise." Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2~
45-,-376 P.2d 946, 948 (Utah, 1962) (Emphasls
added) citing Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined
57 Yal<' L.3. 339, 346. See also, Campos v.
camp~52J P.2d 1235 (Utah, 1974); Nationa~
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Findncc Co. oE Provo v. DalPv, 14 Utah 20
2TI;--~P.2~1-405{utah-,--l9-GJ); Sine v. Helland,
18 utuh 2d 22, 480 (1966); I·Jarrer1-:I"rilgatT6n __ _
Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2cl l03,-;f9s-:P·::zcf--6-67~-670 (1972); Wood v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 133,
427 P. 2cl 398 (1967).
As the undisputed facts in the case before the bar
demonstrate, the Telephone Company commenced litigation in
1970.

See, the Complaint in the case of Mountain States Tel.

& Tel. Co., et al. v. Salt Lake City, R-439.

This la•.vsui t

directly involved the Franchise Ordinance now under attack
and the Business Revenue Tax,

which imposed an

occupation

tax based on the utility company's gross receipts.

This

former litigation also specifically called in question the
validity of the Business Revenue Taxing Ordinance scheme
and included,

l~'

.Lls legal challenge, the assertion that the

percentage o= gross revenue taxation was constitutionally
infirm, because of "discrimination" which allegedly violated
the State and Federal Constitutions.

Further, the plaintiff

alleged that the Business Revenue Tax was invalid as being
in contravention of State enabling statutes and, otherwise
sought to have the tax declared unconstitutional.

See,

Statement of Facts 1 through 6.
In the within controversy, the Telephone Company is
again represented by the same legal counsel who represented
it in the former suit.

Here, again it has hashed up the sane

lequl arguments seeking to have the same Business Revenue
Tux scheme declared "i lle<Jal," "uncnforccahlc" and "unconSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stilutional."

This Company is not only trying to obtain

",~;ubstantially

the same objecti·:e," but, in fact, seeks

cxactl~

the same objective as it sought in the earlier

litigation.
Obviously the Telephone Company is prohibited in this
redundant suit from relitigating the same factual and legal
issues pursuant to the authority above quoted.

However,

some amplification concerning the specific allegations of
the latest complaint will, perhaps, be of some assistance
to the Court, because Appellant's Brief fails to reveal the
full scope of that pleading, upon which they seek a further
hearing.
A.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

Count I of the Company's

Co~plaint

alleges that the

Utility Revenue Tax and Franchise Tax is illegal and unconstitutional because it is alleged that the gross revenue
aspect of the tax constitutes a "utility rate increase".
This substantive issue is discussed in Point I, supra.
However, the allegation is, further, barred from additional
hearing by the principle of res judicata.
In 1970 the Telephone Company sought to declare the
same City ordinance unconstitutional and invalid.

The

present pleading presents a legal issue which was not
previously articulated in the former litigation; however,
i 1~ vJas one which could and should have been raised in that
'

, r·]

i <'!" suit.

This tact is true because the Business Revenue
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Tax and Franchise Fee pass through provisions were known
to exist at that earlier time.

See, Statement of Fact No. 2.

Thus, Count I of the Telephone Company's Complaint,
if it had any legal viability, could and should have been
raised in the earlier 1970 suit.

Certainly, it should not

now be able to attack a rate scheme it conceived, lobbied,
legally defended in 1951, yet failed to challenge in its
1970 suit.

The stipulated dismissal of prejudice of that

1970 suit bars the present attempted resurrection.
B.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.

Count II of the Telephone Company's Complaint asserts
that the Franchise Fee ordinance and the Business Revenue
Tax is illegal

A:•~

unconstitutional, because it allegedly

is not "reasonably proportional" to the cost of service
rendered by the City in implementing the ordinance.

In

the alternative, the Company asserts that the ordinance does
not ''require" the fee to be reasonably proportional to the
cost of service.

Further, plaintiff asserts that the City

taxing scheme imposes taxes on plaintiff "disproportionally"
and without a "rational basis".
The cause of action is so lacl:ing in merit that Appellant did not even address it in its Brief.

In brief, this

claim fails as a matter of law, because the assertions
apply only to regulatory actions and not strictly revenue
wcasures as are involved in this case.
~emorandum

See, exposition in

of Law, Q-424-426.
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However, these legal theories were also generally pled
in paragraph X of the 1970 litigations's Complaint, when
the Company alleged that the tax was discriminatory to the
Plaintiff in contravention of the Federal and Utah Constitutions.

It was further generally pled in the earlier litiga-

tion in the assertion that the Revenue Tax provisions violated Section 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

Thus, the

claims are barred under the principle of res judicata.
C.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION.

Some portions of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action
concern allegations of alleged discriminatory enforcement of
Section 20-3-14.1 of the City Ordinances.

These provisions

impose a tax on companies which compete with the telephone
company and, hence, admittedly involve issues which have
not been litigated in the earlier proceedings.

Thus, the

principle of res judicata would not apply; however, estoppel
by judgment does bar this claim and this legal theory will
be discussed hereafter.
However, to the extent that Company's Third Cause of
Action may purport to assert an illegal classification
of the Telephone company, Utah Power & Light and Mountain
States Fuel Supply Company or to assert that these utilities
are not a distinct and separate class of residents in Salt
Lake city (which are subject to an occupation tax based on
gross revenues) , the principle of res judicata certainly
apply.
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It should specifically be noted that plaintiff's complaint in the 1970 litigation alleges that Section 10-8-80
and other applicable State and Federal constitutional provisions were violated by the alleged discriminatory classification of these organizations for a gross revenue tax.
The Utah Supreme Court decisively ruled against this
assertion in the Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden,
supra, case.

Thus, in addition to the principle of stare

decisis, the plaintiff is conclusively barred from again
raising this issue under the principle of res judicata,
by virtue of their stipulated dismissal of the former litigation.
Collaterally, it is important to note that the 1967
amendments to

~ec~.Jn

20-3-14 of the Revised City Ordinances

did not change the classification affecting the plaintiff
in any particular.

These amendments did increase the

Business Revenue Tax from four to six percent; further, they
did add a provision including competitors of the utilities
within the class of persons subject to the tax.

However,

the classification did not exclude any member previously
taxed and, thus, plaintiff cannot assert that it is suffering from any deprivation or burden by an attempt of the City
to tax others who may be competing with this plaintiff.
A forliori there has been no change in the classification which would allow plaintiff to rolitigate and assert
that they are improperly or discriminatorily classed.
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Rather,

there have only been added additional parties which

would reduce any discriminatory impact on the plaintiff,
even though this Court has ruled that any such discriminatory impact did not raise it to the level which created an
impermissible classification in a constitutional sense.
What the Telephone Company is obviously attempting to
do is to put old legal theories in new bottles, which it
may not do.

Appellant is attempting to have a "second

shot" at establishing the facts for its old legal theories
to

show discriminatory classification or application of

the gross revenue taxation or revenue fees.
An interesting case concerning the latter point and
one closely on target for the issues in the present litigation is McCarthy v. State, l Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387, 389
(1953); 49 A.L.R.2d 1031.

In this case a California contrac-

tor sued the State of Utah in Federal Court, together with
individual members of a Monument Commission, appointed by
the State.

The Federal Court dismissed all parties, specifi-

cally stating that the State of Utah could not be sued by a
citizen of another state, under Article XI of the United
States Constitution.

However, the Federal Court made no

specific finding as to why the individual members of the
1·1onument Conunission were dismissed.
Thereafter, the plaintiff sued in the State court and
the suit was dismissed because the Court ruled that the
former

i1

ction constituted a bar to subsequent litigation on
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implied findings of the Federal court.

The

State Supreme

Court upheld the findings of the lower state court by holding
that inasmuch as all elements of diversity were present in
the Federal Court, the principle of res judicata barred further litigation.

The Court held that the Federal judge

implicitly found that the individual members of the commission
were not liable and that the obligation was one belonging
solely to the State of Utah.

The Utah Supreme Court speci-

fically observed:
"And this is true notwithstanding the fact
that the Court made no such written finding.
The issue having been squarely presented and
determined,
it is res judicata as between
these parties." McCarthy v. Stat~, Id. at
p. 38 9.
Addressing the

I~~ue

of res judicata our court correctly

noted:
"Any other view would create uncertainty by
undermining the conclusive character of judgments and would permit the revival of litigation once terminated; consequences which it
was the very purpose of the doctrine of res
judicata to avoid." McCarthy v. State, Id.
at p. 389.
It is further noted:
"Whether its judgment was right or wrong, it
stands unassailed and is binding upon the
parties."
(Emphasis added) Id. at p. 389.
The plaintiff raised the entire spectrum of discriminatory
application and classificatjon in the previous litigation.

It

had every opportunity to litigate these issues; in fact, they
commenced separate actions against Salt Lake Cjty and Ogden
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City over thes0 precise legal and factual disputes.
The Salt Lake litiqation was terminated, by stipulation
based on this Court's decision in favor of Ogden City, by
able counsel who agreed that the matter should be terminated
"with prejudice".

The Telephone Company, thus, had full and

ample opportunity to litigate all of the issues both legal
and factual relating to these allegations, together with any
other issue concerning the legality, constitutionality or
validity of a Gross Receipt Business Revenue Tax or Franchise
Fee.

The Company forever barred from raising these issues

against the City again.
POINT V
THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE PRINCIPLE
OF COLLATERAL JUDGMENT ESTOPPEL FROM
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE BUSINESS
REVENUE TAX AND THE FRANCHISE FEE PROVISIONS OF THE CITY ORDINANCES.
Although closely related, a separate and distinct legal
principle of estoppel by judgment may operate to bar a
litigant from challenging a judgment or another's reasonable
reliance on that judgment.
The commentators have summarized the principle as
follows:
"The circumstances of a particular case may be
such as to estop a person from setting up the
invalidity of a judgment. In this connection
it has been held that a party cannot be heard
to impeach a judgment which he himself has
procured to be entered in his own favor, and
that one who accepts and retains the fruits
of a judrJrnent is estopped from denylng ltS
validity.
Ur.1_der this rule, lt has been held
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that one who accepts the honefits of a judgment
should be "Jrecluded froM ouestionincJ t:h0vaTIC:f..:
ity of the• burJel1lri\P;::;se(l~S::· an express condition on which the judgment v;as granted." 4 6
Am.Jur.2d, Judgments §51 at p. 350 (Emphasis
added).
Also, this work correctly noted:
"In this respect, it has been declared that in
the application of the doctrine of estoppel
by former verdict or collateral estoppel, it
is immaterial that the prior action sounded
in tort and the later one in contract, or vice
versa."
46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments §429 at p.
599.
The writer has found no Utah cases specifically addressing collateral estoppel by judgment; rather, the cases discussed in Point IV, supra, appear to merge the two principles
into a discussion of res judicata.

The Court has, however,

recently expl<i ',E'- its vie•.- of collateral estoppel which is
SQ~arized

as fellows:

"The interests of justice here require adherence
to the time-honored principle that where one
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss,
it should fall on him who created the circumstances from which it resulted." Hanson v.
Beehive Security Company, 14 U.2d 157, 380
P.2d 66, 67 (Utah, 1963); Migliaccio v. Davis,
232 P.2d 195, 198 (Utah, 1951).
This rule is particularly applicable

as in the present

situation where the Salt Lake City Corporation has relied on
the actions of the plaintiff and the decision of the Utah
Supn:cme Court in funding its municipal operations.
matcly

20~

Approxi-

or in excess or $8,000,000 of its budget for the

creneral fund comes from these sourc,•s.

The Cily should

certAinly bc• cnllt-lcd to every '"'·.'Or.>blr· cnnstruction of
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the principles of E~s judicata and collateral and direct

esto['pel, to protect it in its reliance upon the earlier
suit's dismissal.
Further, in the case before the bar, there are two distinct issues which require the application of the principle
of collateral estoppel by judgment.
Franchise Fee.

The first, concerns the

The facts are not in dispute and demonstrate

that in the early 1950's the plaintiff petitioned the Public
Service Commission for authority to pass through, as a surcharge to its billing, the Franchise Fee for the privilege it
had of the unfettered use of all public streets, roadways and
other rights-of-way.

Further, the plaintiff appeared with

its present attorney in 1953 and was successful in pursuading
the Utah Supreme Court that such a provision, as it urged
upon the Public Service Commission was legal, valid and
constitutional in all particulars.

See, Statement of Fact

No. 3.
Thereafter, the Appellant-Company has enjoyed all of the
fruits and benefits of that arrangement.

For some 25 years

it has dug up City str~ets and hung its wires on public
easements without having to resort to its power of eminent
domain to purchase and acquire rights-of-way of its own.
See, Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Request for Admissions
and Interrogatories No. 6 anc I.
In additior1, the City has relief on the revenue generaL0d

from this source for pre~aring and expending tax revenues
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since 1953, without objeclion 01: chc:lllenge until the v:ithin
litigation.

Even in the 1970 suit which challenged the Busi-

ness Revenue Tax, the utility companies did not seck to raise
in issue the Franchise Fee provisions, which extend for a
period of 50 years from the date of the agreement.

However,

even if it had, it is a fact that the Telephone Company
dismissed that challenge by stipulation, "with prejudice".
The law concerning such dismissals is clearly articulated
and certainly a matter subject to reasonable reliance by the
Salt Lake City Corporation.

It is summarized as follows:

"The term '1·:ith prejudice," expressed in a
judgment of dismissal, has a well-recognized
legal import; it is, of course, the converse
of 'withou:_ : t-eJudice' and indicates an adjudication of th merits, operating as res judicata, concluding the rights of the parties,
terminating the right of action, and precluding
subsequent litigation of the same cause of
action, to the same extent as if the action
had been prosecuted to a fin~l adjudication
adverse to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, a
judgment so rendered operates, in a subsequent action on the same cause of action, so
as to conclusively settle not only all matters
litigated in the earlier proceedings, but also
all matters which might have been litigated
therein."
46 Arn.Jur.2d, Judgments §482 at p.
645 (Emphasis added).
Clearly, the Appellant is estopped

from challenging the

validity of the 1953 Franchise Fee assessment and collection
procedures under these principles by its 1953 and 1970
suits.
With

referenc~

has based its

lo the Business Revenue Tax, the City

hu~gcts

and reasonably relied on the

Co~pany's
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in cstabl ishing scr-·ice levels for the City

consL i tuency, based on rc·.•enucc from the Business Revenue
Tax imposed on the utilities since 1971.

The company should,

likewise, be enjoined and estopped from its present attack
on that method of financing.
It is respectfully submitted that Company's entire
claim's dismissal should be affirmed by this Court.

It is

collaterally estopped by the judgments heretofore rendered,
at its solicitation or by its stipulation, especially since
the Company has enjoyed the benefits and fruits of that
litigation since 1953 and the City's reasonable reliance
thereon.
SUMMARY
The City has passed an occupation

tax and imposed a fee

for franchise privileges (accepted and utilized by the

Tele-

phone Company), consistent with the enabling power granted
the City by the Utah Legislature.

The Public Service

Cornmission, by order approved by this Court, has authorized
those fees and taxes to be passed through to the AppellantCompany's customers, when the Company files appropriate
notice of the local tax impositions.
usurped the Public Service

Co~ission

Thus, the City has not
function of rate

setting and the Appellant-Company's assertion to the contrary
is specious.
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cation and validity of a taxing ordinance and an alleged
discriminatory application of a valid statute.

The bastardiza-

tion of these two theories is improper and they must be
separated for proper analysis.
l~ith

reference to the facial classification of tax-

payers for taxing purposes, the legal principles are well
established.

Such laws are presumed constitutional and every

reasonable presumption will be indulged in by the Court to
uphold their validity.

In short, legislative bodies have

the broadest latitude in forming classifications.
laws will be held unconstitutional only if the
find no

re~s~~~Gle

Taxing

courts can

basis to justify the classification and

where the law patently fails to equally treat persons
similarly situated.
In the instant case. the ordinance, on its face,

in-

cludes within the scope of a classification of persons taxed,
all competitors of the three named utilities.

Thus, as a

matter of law there can be no factual or legal issues concerning proper facial classification
Further, to challenge an alleged discriminatory application of a taxing statute, one must allege and establish
that there was an intentional systematic failure to
apply the tax.

uniform~

The Appellant-Company has failed even to

allege such a theory.
In addition, the undisputej facts of record demonstrate
that the City has exerted a qooc faith effort to equitably
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and uniformly apply the taxing ordinance.

Thus, the Appel-

lant's Brief fails to state' a claim upon which relief can
be granted and, further has failed to establish any disputed issues of fact to oppose the City's 11otion for Summary
Judgment.
The Telephone Company-.ll.ppellant has, further, attempted
to resurrect a legal dispute which originated in a suit
filed in 1970 by it and two other utility companies.

That

suit involved virtually identical issues of fact and law.
How~ver,

after an adverse ruling on the major points, all

the plaintiffs, including this Appellant-Company, stipulated
to a dismissal of that suit, with prejudice.
Therefore, all of the issues which were raised or which
could have been raised in the former litigation are barred
from retrial in the present litigation under the principle
of res judicata.
(a)

The allegation of its First Cause of Action that

Salt Lake City
(b)

The issues thus barred include:

is illegally setting utility rates,

The allegation of its Second Cause of Action that

the gross revenue tax is not reasonably proportional to the
costs of service rendered by Salt Lake City in implementing
or enforcing the tax and,
(c)

The tax is illegal, unconstitutional or beyond

the City enabling power.
Also, each of those subjects are barred under the
,,,·inciplc> of collateral estoppel by judgment.
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Thus, the Appellant-Telephone Company's Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

There

are no material issues of fact and the lower court properly
dismissed the litigation.

This Court

should affirm the

lower court's ruling.
Respectfully submitted,

ROGER F, CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
535-7788
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